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1 Tel.: þ1 304 293 7889.Furthermore, a firm that chooses private debt has the
choice to borrow from a bank or a non-bank intermediary
such as an insurance company. The focus of this paper is on
the firm’s choice between public and private debt and on
the subsequent choice between bank and non-bank private
debt.2 While there are a number of papers that address
various aspects of the public versus private debt decisions,
to the best of our knowledge there is no paper that syn-
thesises the predictions and findings of the research in this
area. Our objective is to present the major theoretical and
empirical findings of the research on a firm’s decision to
choose between public and private debt, as well as among
the types of private debt.2 We present findings on debt characteristics only in terms of the
firm’s choice between public and private debt. There is also
research that investigates debt characteristics in terms of maturity
(Barnea, Haugen, & Senbet, 1980; Kale & Noe, 1990; Barclay &
Smith, 1995a; Hoven-Stohs & Mauer, 1996; Guedes & Opler,
1996), priority structure (Barclay & Smith, 1995b; Park, 2000),
and inclusion of restrictive covenants (Berlin & Mester, 1992;
Berger & Udell, 1990, 1995; Carey et al., 1998; John, Lynch, &
Puri, 2003; Booth & Booth, 2006).
6 J.R. Kale, C. MeneghettiThe extant literature on a firm’s decision to choose
between public and private debt can be classified into two
broadly defined sets. The first set includes papers that utilise
information-based arguments to explain a firm’s public/
private debt decision. Information-based theories include
those where banks are information producers (e.g.,
Nakamura, 1993), those where banks are preferred by firms
with proprietary information, and those where banks are
better monitors of firm performance and management
actions. The second set of papers ascribes the advantage of
bank loans over public debt to a bank’s superior ability to
liquidate the firm or renegotiate loan contract terms in the
event of financial distress (e.g., Rajan, 1992).3 More recently,
researchers have delved further into a firm’s decision to use
private debt by examining the choice between bank versus
non-bankprivate lending institutions (e.g., Rauh&Sufi,2010).
We present the findings from the papers that distinguish
between bank and non-bank lenders after the discussion of
the choice between public and private debt.
Our paper is organised as follows. In the first section we
describe information-based models and discuss the empir-
ical support in the literature for their predictions. In the
second section we review the theoretical and empirical
papers that are based on the superior ability of banks to
deal with firms in financial distress. The third section
compares the findings regarding the choice between bank
and non-bank private debt, and the fourth section presents
some concluding remarks.
Information-based explanations of the public
vs. private debt decision
In the first set of information-based papers that we discuss
below, producing information is costly and bank debt is
preferred over public debt when banks can produce infor-
mation at a lower cost. The second strand consists of
papers analysing a different type of informational advan-
tage of banks over public debtdthe ability of banks to keep
proprietary information confidential. In these models the
desire for confidentiality is the main reason why firms
choose bank over public debt. The third group of informa-
tion-based models deals with moral hazard. The underlying
theme in these moral hazard models is that banks have
better ability than the general public to monitor firm/
manager activities after the loan is made. Information plays
a key role in all these three sets of models but in a subtly
different way. In the set of models where banks have cost
advantages in information production, they produce infor-
mation before providing the financing. In the moral-hazard
models, banks are monitoring agents who are better able to
produce information after providing the financing.3 In the theoretical papers analysing the choice between public
and private debt, public debt clearly refers to debt securities
issued to the general public, for example, corporate bonds. On the
other hand, even though the term private debt can apply to
borrowing from any financial intermediary, the term used in the
literature for the financial intermediary is almost always ‘bank’.
For expositional ease, we follow these authors’ convention of
referring to the private lender as a bank when we discuss these
papers in the earlier part (the first and second sections).Costly information-production models
Producing the information required to issue public securities is
expensive as prospective borrowers are required to submit
certified financial statements and apply for SEC (Securities and
Exchange Commission) registration (Blackwell & Kidwell,
1988). Disclosing information to banks, on the other hand, is
less costly, since banks have access to the firm’s transaction
accounts and can gather much of the required non-public
information at low cost (Nakamura, 1993). Because the cost of
producing the information required for public debt financing is
high, small firms tend to relymore on bank loans (Fama, 1985).
Further, Nakamura (1993) argues that the informational
advantageofbankdebt is less pronounced for big firmsbecause
their numerous accounts are usually spread over a greater
number of banks and each bank only has access to partial
information.Thus, forbigfirms thecostadvantage inborrowing
from a bank is considerably lower. Both Fama (1985) and
Nakamura (1993) predict that small firms use more bank debt.
Hadlock and James (2002) investigate another aspect of bank
information production besides the cost of producing infor-
mation. These authors focus on the bank’s ability to correctly
price the firm’s claims and thus reduce the adverse selection
costs the firm incurs when undervalued. In this framework, the
prediction is that undervalued firms rely more on bank debt.4
Empirical evidence on the choice between public and
bank debt, by and large, supports the predictions of models
of that are based on information production costs. Consis-
tentwith the arguments in Fama (1985) andNakamura (1993)
that it is less costly in big firms to produce the information
required to issue public debt, several papers find a positive
relation between firm size and level of public debt in the
firm’s balance sheet (Houston& James, 1996; Johnson, 1997;
Krishnaswami, Spindt, & Subramaniam, 1999; Cantillo &
Wright, 2000; Denis & Mihov, 2003). Hadlock and James
(2002) also find support for their hypothesis that banks can
price a firm’s claims with better accuracy than public
lenders: using return volatility and stock price run-ups to
measure undervaluation, they find that undervalued firms
prefer bank debt. Krishnaswami et al. (1999) find evidence
consistent with the intuition that banks’ lower information
production costs are more valuable when information
asymmetry is severe. These authorsmeasure the information
asymmetry between the firm and the lenders by the residual
volatility in the firm’s stock returns (computed as the stan-
dard deviation of the residuals of the market model regres-
sion) and find a positive relation between the level of
information asymmetry and the ratio of privately placed
long-term debt to total long-term debt.5 On the other hand,
Denis and Mihov (2003) measure information asymmetry by
the ratio of research and development (R&D) expenses to
sales and find no relation between the variable and the
likelihood that firm takes out a bank loan.4 The intuition in Hadlock and James (2002) is similar in spirit to
the role played by private equity placement in Hertzel and Smith
(1993). These authors provide evidence that private equity place-
ment is a mechanism that can signal equity undervaluation.
5 The standard deviation of the residuals of the market model
regression isolates firm-specific uncertainty after controlling for
market-wide systematic uncertainty.
6 Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) and Roberts and Sufi (2009a)
investigate the extent of the impact of incentive conflicts
between lenders and borrowers on investment and financial poli-
cies respectively.
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Strategic information, for example, information on a firm’s
marketing and advertising strategies or R&D activities, is
valuable to the firm’s rivals, and the value of such propri-
etary information diminishes if revealed. In order to obtain
public debt financing at better terms, however, the reve-
lation of such information may be necessary for the issuing
firm to prove its creditworthiness. Proprietary information
models posit that firms with proprietary information that is
likely valuable to rivals will prefer banks to public lenders
because banks have the ability to keep sensitive informa-
tion confidential (Campbell, 1979).
The intuition above implies that constraints in capital
markets as well as in the firm’s product markets affect the
firm’s choice of financing source. Bhattacharya and Ritter
(1983) develop a model where one firm needs external
financing and has valuable private information relating to its
R&D activities. If the firm divulges the technological infor-
mation, it can obtain better financing terms in the market
but it will then lose the R&D informational advantage over its
competitors. In the ensuing equilibrium, the firm with
superior private information discloses part of that informa-
tion as a signal, so that financing for R&D can be obtained at
better terms. Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) develop the
above argument further, and compare bilateral bank-firm
agreements with multifirm-multibank agreements. These
authors show that it is optimal for the bank to reveal private
information to the firm’s competitor who is borrowing from
the same bank when the probability of producing a patent-
able invention (conditional on the interim stage input of R&D
knowledge) is low. The intuition is that the bank shares R&D
knowledge with the rival firm in order to increase the
probability that both firms are solvent at maturity. This
endogenously determined ‘information leakage’, however,
also creates a free-rider problem that negatively affects the
firm’s incentives to invest in R&D in the first place. The
tradeoff between these two effects determines the choice
between a bilateral and a multilateral financing agreement.
Yosha (1995) explicitly considers the inference third
parties can make from the firm’s financing choice. In his
model the informational disadvantage of public debt stems
from the stronger requirements to provide lenders with
detailed information in order to prove creditworthiness.
Firms that have sensitive information that cannot be divulged
to the competition prefer a bilateral financing agreement
because it requires less disclosure of verifiable information.
Although competitors can observe the firm’s financing choice,
the cost differential between bilateral and multilateral
financing prevents them from inferring with certainty that
the firm is hiding positive information. Thus, in equilibrium,
firms with sensitive information choose bank debt. We note
here that the Yosha (1995) study does not focus on lender-
borrower conflicts but on the signalling role of the firm’s
financing choice and its effects on product markets.
Proprietary information models have some interesting
empirical implications. First, innovative firmsefirms more
likely to have positive information worth hiding from the
competitiondshould choose bank over public debt in
order to conceal the private information. Johnson (1997)
measures the firm’s positive information with itsmarket-to-book ratio, and finds that the ratio is not
a significant determinant of the firm’s debt structure.
Krishnaswami et al. (1999) measure favourable private
information with the unexpected future earnings of the
firm, which are computed as the difference between actual
earnings per share and forecasted earnings per share in
year t þ 1 scaled by earnings per share in year t. They show
that firms with higher unexpected earnings rely more on
private debt than other firms, but only if they have serious
information asymmetry problems. Thus, they show that
positive private information is a determinant of the firm’s
financing choices, but only when information asymmetries
between firm and lenders are severe.
Proprietary information models also predict that the
announcement of a bilateral financing agreement should
trigger a positive stock response because it is a signal that
the firm has positive information. Lummer and McConnell
(1989), Szewczyk and Varma (1991), Preece and
Mullineaux (1994), and Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel
(1995) find evidence of a positive stock response to the
announcement of private placement of debt. Mikkelson and
Partch (1986) and James (1987), however, find evidence of
a positive stock response to the announcement of bank
loans, but zero or negative response to the announcement
of a non-bank private loan. Finally, Best and Zhang (1993)
find no significant abnormal return following the
announcement of a new bank loan.
Moral-hazard models
The intuition underlying moral hazard models of financial
intermediation is that shareholders of levered firms some-
times need to be monitored because they have incentives to
engage in actions that are damaging to debtholders. Jensen
and Meckling (1976), for example, show that shareholders
of a levered firm have the incentive to invest in risky projects
because their downside risk is bounded by limited liability,
while the potential benefit from the project is unlimited.
Galai and Masulis (1976) also demonstrate such asset
substitution incentives by modelling the equity of a levered
firm as a call option on the firm’s assets, and showing that
shareholders have the incentive to increase the volatility of
the firm’s asset to increase the value of the firm’s equity.
Because debtholders have priority claims on a firm’s cash
flows, Myers (1977) highlights the possible ‘underinvest-
ment’ problem where shareholders of a firm with risky debt
forgopositivenetpresent value (NPV)projectswhen the cash
flows of the project go primarily towards repaying the face
value of debt. It follows that rational lenders anticipate
shareholders’ incentives for asset substitution and underin-
vestment and either monitor the firm or demand a higher
yield.6
Moral hazard models of the public/private debt choice
build around the notion that it is more efficient for one
financial intermediary to monitor a firm than it is for
multiple individual investors, because each investor has the
7 The manager’s incentive to invest in the lower-value pet project
depends on (i) the percentage of the project’s financial payoffs the
manager receives as compensation, and (ii) the expected value of
the financial payoffs and the private benefits.
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In Diamond (1984) the free-riding problem can be resolved
if one bank pools resources from many depositors and lends
to many firms. In the model, a bank monitors managerial
actions at a lower cost compared to multiple public lenders
because it avoids duplication of effort and free-riding.
Diamond (1984) shows that the delegation of the monitoring
task to a bank is feasible when the bank lends to multiple
firms with projects whose returns are independent because
this diversification increases the probability that the bank
has enough proceeds to pay back its depositors.
Building on his earlier model, Diamond (1991) investi-
gates how the interplay between bank monitoring and
borrower reputation affects the choice between public and
bank debt. A new borrower borrows from a bank to develop
a ‘good’ reputation that, with time, allows lenders to
predict its future actions. Borrowers with a good reputation
can use public financing because the cost of losing repu-
tation prevents them from engaging in self-interested
actions. The Diamond (1991) model has some interesting
empirical implications. First, it implies that new borrowers,
for example, start-ups or young firms, initially submit to
bank monitoring to acquire a reputation capital and then
switch to public debt. Another implication of the model is
that firms with a middle-range credit rating prefer bank
debt, while firms with very high or very low credit rating
prefer public debt. The intuition for this second prediction
is that firms with a high credit rating (i.e., good-reputation
firms) face lower capital costs in the market and thus higher
loss of future profits in case of default. On the other hand,
firms with very low credit rating have a higher cost of
capital and, therefore, have less to lose by defaulting or by
being caught engaging in self-interested actions when
monitored. Thus, monitoring does not provide sufficient
deterrents (for bad-reputation firms) to avoid self-inter-
ested actions.
The work of Besanko and Kanatas (1993) contributes to
this strand of theoretical literature by allowing firms to use
banks and capital markets simultaneously, and by endoge-
nising the bank’s monitoring incentives. In their model, the
entrepreneur has a stake in the firm and can improve the
probability of project success by exerting additional effort.
External financing, however, reduces the entrepreneur’s
payoff from the project since he has to share the cash flow
with the lenders. As a result of the lower expected payoff
from the project, the entrepreneur has less of an incentive
to exert additional effort. In such a setting, banks can
monitor the entrepreneur and force him to supply more
effort. In the equilibrium that ensues, the entrepreneur
finances the project with a mix of public and bank debt,
although the level of bank monitoring is less than what
would be considered optimal by outside claimants. The
lower level of bank monitoring results because the entre-
preneur trades off a higher level of bank debt with its
greater monitoring against the personal cost (increased
effort) that would result from bank monitoring.
Shareholders usually do not make investing and financing
decisions, but delegate these tasks to a manager. In the
frameworks of Diamond (1991) and Besanko and Kanatas
(1993) described above, the assumption is that share-
holders always agree with the manager’s decisions. There
are instances, however, when the manager’s interests arenot perfectly aligned with the objectives of the share-
holders. In Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993), for
example, the manager can invest either in a good project
with high financial payoffs or in a pet project with low
financial payoffs but private benefits that accrue to the
manager but not to the shareholders.7 The role of bank
debt is to monitor the manager’s project choice to guar-
antee that he invests in the good project.
The Hoshi et al. (1993) model’s main empirical predic-
tion is that when the firm has a high Tobin’s Q (which
measures the attractiveness of the firm’s investment
opportunities), the manager does not need to be monitored
because the expected financial payoffs from the good
project are higher than the private benefits from the pet
project. For an intermediate level of Tobin’s Q, however,
the manager finds it optimal to submit to bank monitoring
and invest in the good project rather than using public debt
and investing in the inefficient pet project. Finally, for low
levels of Tobin’s Q, the manger issues public bonds because
he loses little by not investing in the efficient project. The
model also predicts that firms with tangible assets that can
be used as collateral issue public debt more often. The
intuition here is that collateral makes debt less risky and
thus less expensive, which allows the manager to keep most
of the financial payoffs from the project, and this makes
him less likely to choose the pet project. Finally, the model
predicts that levered firms prefer bank debt because
leverage makes debt riskier and more expensive. Then,
since the manager receives less of the cash flows from the
good project, he has the incentive to invest in the pet
project to receive the private benefits. Under these
circumstances bank monitoring may be the mechanism that
provides the incentive to the manager to invest in the good
project.
Almazan and Suarez (2003) explicitly consider the role
of separation between ownership and control in the choice
between public and private debt. In their model the
manager controls the investment and financing decisions,
while the shareholders can only affect the manager’s
choices by offering a contract that links compensation to
firm value. The conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders arises from the fact that managers alone bear
the costs of bank monitoring, while the potential benefits
have to be shared with the firm’s owners. As in Hoshi et al.
(1993), managers can extract private benefits at the
expense of shareholders, and this incentive can only be
controlled by monitoring and incentive compensation. The
model identifies two optimal financial regimesdseparat-
ing and pooling. In the separating regime, the manager of
a firm with a low-profitability project issues public debt,
receives a flat reward profile, and extracts private bene-
fits, while the manager of a firm with a high-profitability
project uses bank financing and submits to monitoring,
receives incentive compensation, and refrains from
extracting private benefits. In the pooling regime, on the
other hand, the manager always chooses bank debt,
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benefits. In the separating regime shareholders save on
compensation costs if the project’s profitability is high,
but lose on production efficiency if the project’s profit-
ability is low, because the manager extracts private
benefits (thus reducing the probability of success). Thus,
shareholders prefer the separating regime when
the probability of a highly profitable project is high. The
Almazan and Suarez (2003) model predicts that when the
information asymmetry problem (interpreted as
the difference in profitability between high- and low-
profitability firms) is severe, firms with positive informa-
tion choose bank debt. The model also implies a positive
stock price reaction to the announcement of bank loans
and a positive relation between the degree of information
asymmetry and the size of the bank loan announcement
effect. Finally, the model predicts that pay-performance-
sensitivity is higher for firms with more bank debt.
In the Hoshi et al. (1993) and Almazan and Suarez (2003)
frameworks, the relation between incentive compensation
and financing decisions is driven by the manager’s incen-
tives to extract private benefits at the expense of the
shareholders, and the role of bank monitoring and incentive
compensation is to protect shareholders’ interests by
forcing the manager to avoid pet projects. In Meneghetti
(2010), equity-based compensation aligns manager and
shareholder interests but also provides the manager with
the incentive to engage in self-interested actions, such as
asset substitution, to expropriate lenders in favour of
shareholders. Banks can monitor the manager’s actions and
punish the manager that invests in the inefficient project,
while public lenders can only rationally anticipate the
manager’s incentives for asset substitution activities and
require a higher yield. The model predicts that managers
with low incentive compensation prefer public debt
because their incentive to invest in the inefficient project is
very low. Managers who receive high incentive compensa-
tion, on the other hand, submit to bank monitoring and thus
‘commit’ to investing in the efficient project.
Empirical evidence on the validity of models of the choice
between public and private debt based on moral hazard is
mixed. Krishnaswami et al. (1999) find a positive relation
between a firm’s market-to-book ratio and the percentage
of privately placed long-term debt, which is not consistent
with the prediction that the manager of a firm with good
projects does not need to be monitored (Hoshi et al., 1993).
In Houston and James (1996) and Johnson (1997), the rela-
tion is also not significant, and Denis and Mihov (2003) find
that market-to-book is not a significant determinant of the
likelihood that a firm takes out a bank loan.
A possible explanation why the relation between Tobin’s
Q and level of bank debt is not supported empirically may
lie in the differences between the models in the genre of
Diamond (1991) and those in the genre of Hoshi et al.
(1993). In the former, there is no agency conflict between
shareholders and managers since managers are assumed to
act in the interest of the shareholders, whereas the latter
explicitly allow for the tension between the objectives of
managers and shareholders. The substitutability between
monitoring through bank debt and controlling managerial
investment decisions through compensation-based incen-
tives implies that the empirical relation between Tobin’s Qand the use of public/private debt will depend on the level
and structure of the compensation of firm managers.
Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), and Denis
and Mihov (2003) all find that bank borrowers have less
tangible assets than public issuers, which supports the
Hoshi et al. (1993) hypothesis that, since collateral makes
debt less risky and cheaper, firms with tangible assets that
can be used as collateral prefer public debt. Empirical
evidence, however, does not support the prediction that
firms with higher leverage prefer bank debt: in fact all the
above papers find a negative relation between leverage and
the level of bank debt or the likelihood that a firm takes out
a bank loan.
The prediction in Almazan and Suarez (2003) that firms
with positive private information choose bank debt when the
information asymmetry problem is severe is supported by the
finding that the relation between unexpected earnings and
level of private debt is positive, but only for the subset of
firms with severe information asymmetry problems
(Krishnaswami et al., 1999). The result is also consistent with
the argument that firms with positive information choose
bank debt to keep the good news from competitors. The
model in Almazan and Suarez also implies a positive stock
price reaction to the announcement of bank loans, evenmore
so when there is information asymmetry between firm and
lenders. Consistent with this prediction, Best and Zhang
(1993) find a positive stock reaction to a bank loan
announcement when the financial analysts’ earnings forecast
error is high. Finally, the finding that the probability of issuing
public debt is negatively related to managerial ownership
(Denis & Mihov, 2003) supports the prediction that firms with
high managerial equity-based compensation are more likely
to choose bank debt (Hoshi et al., 1993; Almazan & Suarez,
2003; Meneghetti, 2010).
As the above discussion of implies, the main intuition
underlying moral hazard models is that bank debt is
preferred over public debt whenever bank monitoring adds
to firm value. This intuition would then also imply that firms
will choose alternatives to bank/private debt when moni-
toring is very costly. It is likely that, when monitoring is
extremely difficult, firms will resort either to more public
debt or choose other monitoring mechanisms such as
managerial compensation-based incentives or corporate
governance.Liquidation/renegotiation
There is a strand of the literature that explains the advan-
tage of bank loans over public debt in terms of the banks’
superior ability in dealing with firms in financial distress and
deciding whether to force the firm into bankruptcy or to
renegotiate the loan. Financial flexibility is important even if
the firm is not in financial distress: Roberts and Sufi (2009b)
show that the vast majority of private debt agreements are
renegotiated following new information about the firm’s
credit quality, with lower interest rates and additional credit
generally following increases in borrowers’ size and
decreases in their leverage.
Berlin and Loeys (1988) compare two types of financial
contracts: debt contracts with covenants based on public
10 J.R. Kale, C. Meneghettinoisy indicators, and loans with covenants monitored by
a hired financial intermediary. In their model, costly
monitoring detects the firm’s future solvency with higher
accuracy, allowing the lender to continue to finance good
projects and liquidate bad projects. The firm’s choice of
the optimal financing source depends on the tradeoff
between a lender that charges a high cost for supplying
capital and the ability to make the right liquidation deci-
sion (the bank), and lenders that provide debt at a lower
cost but who, on average, allow too many bad projects to
continue and too many good projects to be liquidated.
When banks are in charge of the liquidation decision,
they gain a bargaining advantage in negotiations with firms
in financial distress. Sharpe (1990) first develops the idea
that banks have more information on their customers than
other investors and are thus able to extract rents from the
borrowing firm. Rajan (1992) builds on the same intuition
and develops a model where banks have the ability, when
compared to arm’s-length investors, to determine if
a project should be continued or liquidated. The Rajan
(1992) model compares the effect of short- and long-term
bank loans and long-term public debt on the manager’s
incentives to exert effort.
In his model, an entrepreneur receives external
financing, invests in a project, and exerts some effort.
Then the entrepreneur privately observes the realisation
of the state of the world, which determines if continuing
the project is efficient or not: a positive state of the world
guarantees that continuing the project has a positive NPV,
while a negative one implies that continuing the project
has a negative NPV. The effort exerted by the entrepre-
neur affects the probability of the good state occurring.
Since the entrepreneur has a residual claim on the project
cash flow, he always has the incentive to continue the
project, even if the net present value is negative. With
a short-term bank loan the bank can observe the realisa-
tion of the state of the world through its monitoring
technology and ask for repayment, whether the project
continuation has a positive expected NPV or not. If the
project has a positive NPV and the entrepreneur’s source
of financing is a single bank, the entrepreneur has to
‘bribe’ the bank to be able to continue the project.
However, sharing the surplus with the bank negatively
affects the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort.
Alternatively, with a long-term bank loan the bank cannot
demand repayment until the project is completed, even if
it learns that the expected NPV is negative. In such a case,
it is the bank that has to bribe the entrepreneur to
persuade him to stop the project. However, because states
where the project has a negative NPV are now more
attractive, the entrepreneur has less of an incentive to
exert effort to reduce the probability of those states.
Finally, if the entrepreneur issues public debt, repayment
is due when the project is completed and the profitability
of the project cannot be observed until then. The main
difference between bank and public debt is that banks can
observe the profitability of the project and bargain with
the entrepreneur for the continuation/liquidation of the
project, and, ultimately on the firm’s profits. This bar-
gaining power, however, distorts the entrepreneur’s
incentives to exert effort. On the other hand, public
investors do not bargain on the firm’s profit and do notaffect the entrepreneur’s optimal effort level; however,
they cannot liquidate the project when it would be
optimal to do so (when the NPV is negative).
In Rajan (1992), banks are assumed to have access to
private information that is not available to public lenders.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) relax this assumption and
develop a model that describes why banks have an infor-
mational advantage over bondholders and how firms choose
between public and bank debt. In their model, firms may be
in financial distress because of a poor project choice, in
which case they should be liquidated, or because of external
circumstances, in which case they should be allowed to
continue operations under a renegotiated debt agreement.
Banks, as opposed to public debtholders, operate over
a long-term horizon and build a reputation for making the
right liquidation vs. renegotiation decision when the
borrower is in financial distress. The need to protect their
reputation capital gives banks the incentive to invest
resources in information production. The model implies that
firms that are more likely to be in financial distress, and thus
need the lender to be able to make the correct liquidation/
renegotiation decision, prefer bank debt.
Along similar lines, Detragiache (1994) presents a model
where public and private debt are substitute, but only
private debt can be renegotiated if the firm is insolvent.
Thakor and Wilson (1995) also assume that banks are better
than public lenders in dealing with financially distressed
firms. Their focus, however, is on the effect of the bank
capital requirements on the firm’s choice of financing
source. Their model implies that when capital requirements
are increased, the loan interest rate rises and banks are less
likely to restructure a distressed loan, thus forcing firms to
switch to capital markets for their financing needs. This
effect is more severe for growth-oriented firms, as they
usually take longer to recover from financial distress. In
Cantillo and Wright (2000), banks are better reorganisers
than arm’s-length investors, but have a higher cost of
capital. The Cantillo and Wright (2000) model predicts that
firms with high and stable cash flows and high-profitability
prefer public debt because they are less likely to be in
financial distress and need a good reorganiser. Firms with
poorer prospects, on the other hand, take out banks loans.
While the previous models limit the firm’s financing
options to debt, Bolton and Freixas (2000) propose an
equilibrium model where equity issues, public debt, and
bank loans coexist. Bank debt is easier to restructure, but it
is also more expensive since the intermediation cost (here
modelled as the cost of raising equity to meet capital
requirements) is borne by the firm. Public debt is cheaper,
but it involves a bankruptcy cost because the firm is always
liquidated in case of default and no renegotiation is
possible. Finally, with equity issues there are no bankruptcy
costs, but there might be higher dilution costs since firms
issuing equity are perceived as undervalued. The model
predicts that the riskiest firms either do not obtain funding
or issue equity; safer firms take out bank loans; the safest
firms turn to the capital market for their financing needs. In
Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007), the tradeoff
theory explains the mix of bank and non-bank debt in
a firm’s capital structure and the priority structure of the
firm’s claims. Consistent with empirical evidence that large
and old firms use a mix of bank and public debt while small
The choice between public and private debt 11and young firms rely exclusively on bank debt, the model
predicts that firms with bargaining power use a mix of
senior bank debt and public debt, while firms with no bar-
gaining power use bank debt only.8
The empirical evidence generally supports models of the
choice between public and bank debt that focus on the
bank’s ability to optimally liquidate the firm in financial
distress or renegotiate its debt. Consistent with the argu-
ment that bank debt is more valuable when the firm is more
likely to be in financial distress, Johnson (1997) finds
a negative relation between the earnings growth volatility
(which measures credit risk) and the level of public debt in
the firm’s balance sheet, and Denis and Mihov (2003) find
that firms with investment grade debt rating and higher
Altman Z-Score are more likely to choose public debt.
If the firm has a good project and a bank is the only
financing source, the entrepreneur has to share the surplus
with the bank to be allowed to continue the project and,
therefore, has less incentives to exert effort. This problem
is likely to be more severe for firms with substantial growth
opportunities and intangible assets. Rajan (1992) suggests
that, under some conditions, multiple bank relationships
can solve the hold-up problem. Houston and James (1996)
empirically investigate the implication of the information
hold-up problem. They use market-to-book ratio and R&D
expenses to measure the firm’s growth opportunities and
intangible assets and find a positive relation between the
variables and the firm reliance on bank debt, but only for
firms with multiple bank relationships. This evidence is
consistent with the notion that the hold-up problem
negatively affects firms’ reliance on bank loans. Arena and
Howe (2009) find additional empirical support to the
importance of financial flexibility in the choice of the firm’s
financing source. They argue that the ability to renegotiate
a loan and include restrictive covenants in the loan
agreement protects banks from the negative effect of
takeover threats on debt value. Consistent with the
hypothesis, they find that firms that are more exposed to
takeover threats are more likely to borrow from banks than
to issue public debt.
Bank versus non-bank private debt
Most research on the determinants of the firm’s financing
sources does not distinguish between bank and non-bank
private debt. An exception is the analysis in Johnson (1997)
who shows that the proportion of fixed assets in a firm’s
balance sheet is negatively related to the proportion of
non-bank debt, which indicates that non-bank financial
institutions serve riskier firms. Denis and Mihov (2003) find
no relation between fixed assets and the likelihood of
borrowing from a non-bank institution, but do find that
investment grade firms (i.e., safer firms) are more likely to
borrow from a bank.8 DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) develop a dynamic model that
explains the coexistence of public and bank debt. In their model,
however, bank debt is characterised as a credit line from which the
agent optimally draws funds if he cannot make debt payments out
of the project cash flows.Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) investigate the speciali-
sation in private market corporate lending and find that
while bank and non-bank borrowers do not differ in terms
of asymmetric information problems, they do differ in
terms of observable risk; specifically, banks serve low-risk
borrowers, while non-bank financial institutions serve high-
risk borrowers. They offer two explanations for this result.
The first explanation is that regulations and capital
requirements limit banks’ risk-taking ability. The second
explanation is that banks develop a reputation for being
reasonable with firms in financial distress and, thus, in
order to protect their reputation and not force firms into
liquidation very often, they only serve medium to low-risk
firms. Consistent with both explanations, Carey et al.
(1998) find that borrowers at financial institutions that
are subsidiaries of US bank holding companies are less risky
than borrowers at financial companies that are not affili-
ated with banks. To distinguish between the regulatory and
the reputational hypotheses Carey et al. (1998) investigate
borrowers at institutions affiliated with banks that have
a name similar to that of the affiliated bank, and borrowers
at financial companies that are affiliated with a bank but
have a very different name. Consistent with the reputa-
tional hypothesis, they find that borrowers at affiliated
institutions that have a name similar to that of the affili-
ated bank are less risky. Arena and Howe (2009) also find
that firms with better credit quality in terms of leverage
and subordinated debt outstanding are more likely to
borrow from banks than to issue 144A debt.
Finally, Rauh and Sufi (2010) investigate the distribution
of types of debt across firms’ credit quality using a novel
dataset that includes bank debt, straight bond debt,
convertible bond debt, program debt (such as commercial
paper), and mortgage debt. They show that most firms
simultaneously use different types of debt, and that the
correlation between firm profitability and leverage varies
across different debt structures, suggesting that it is
important to account for debt heterogeneity when inves-
tigating the determinants of a firm’s capital structure. They
also find that firms with a low credit rating tend to have
a multi-tiered debt structure and high variation in the
priority structure.Concluding remarks
There is a large body of theoretical and empirical research
that investigates the firm’s debt structure and the reasons
why firms use different types of debt. The topic is not trivial,
as most firms exhibit some degree of heterogeneity in their
debt structure (Rauh & Sufi, 2010). Further, differentiation
across types of debt seems to significantly affect the firm’s
capital structure decisionsdFaulkender and Petersen
(2006), for example, find that firms that have access to
public markets have on average leverage ratios that are 50%
higher than firms that do not have access to public markets
and rely only on private debt. In this paper we reviewed the
literature on the determinants of the firm’s choice between
public and private debt. We first discussed the choice
between public versus private debt, and then summarised
the finding from research that analyses the difference
between bank and non-bank private debt.
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and private debt is governed by four basic factors, which
are not mutually exclusive. First is the degree to which
a firm needs certification: the greater the need the greater
the reliance on bank debt. Second, issuing public debt may
result in the leakage of (valuable) proprietary information
and, thus, firms with greater proprietary information will
prefer bank debt. Third, when monitoring of managerial
actions (such as investment choices) creates value, bank
debt will be preferred over public debt. Finally, firms will
exhibit a preference for bank debt when the flexibility to
renegotiate debt contracts is valuable (for example, during
financial distress).
While our understanding of corporate preferences for
different sources of debt has grown considerably over the
last couple of decades, there are still many issues that beg
for further research. A potentially fruitful approach would
be to not focus on individual financing sources but to
consider simultaneously the entire panoply of debt securi-
ties that firms employ. A theoretical model with such a high
level of richness would likely prove too cumbersome a task.
However, empirical work along such lines is certainly
a possibilitydthe recent work by Rauh and Sufi (2010)
described above is an important step in this direction.
Literature has also recently recognised that firms satisfy
their capital needs not just by issuing securities in financial
markets and borrowing from banks and other intermediaries.
Operational decisions such as a firm’s trade credit policy also
have significant implications for a firm’s financing plan. The
paper by Peterson and Rajan (1997) presents convincing
evidence onhow trade credit can take the place of bank credit
in thecaseof small firms. Interestingly, theyalsopointout that
large public firms have even larger proportions of their assets
(liabilities) in the form of accounts receivable (payable). This
observation has generated a line of research (e.g., Gianetti,
Burkart, & Ellingsen, in press) that highlights the difference
between bank financing and trade credit. Banks lend money
and suppliers lend goods; and it is much easier for the firm
manager todivertmoney for‘other’ uses than specificgoods. It
follows then that in firms where it is easier for managers to
divert money, financing with trade credit is more likely.
Most of the research on the choice between public and
private debt uses data from economies where both capital
markets and the banking sector are well developed.9 Rajan
and Zingales (1995) study the financing decisions of firms in
such countries (the G-7 group of countries). The surprising
finding in their paper is that leverage levels in firms do not
necessarily vary on the basis of whether a G-7 country is
market-oriented (e.g., the United States) or bank-oriented
(e.g., Germany). The country’s orientation does, however,
affect the mix of public versus bank debt in the capital
structures of firms in that countrydfirms in bank-oriented
economies will have a greater proportion of bank debt.
Further research is needed to understand why it is the mix
of public and bank debt and not the level of debt that is
affected by the relative importance of financial markets
and banks as financing sources. Findings from this research
should also be of considerable interest to policymakers in
countries where banks have historically been the primary9 However, the size of the two may not be similar.source of capital for firms and stock and bond markets are
relatively new and smaller in size.
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